



DolphinAttack: Inaudible Voice Commands

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Outline

- 1. Background of Voice Assistants
- 2. Design of DolphinAttack
- 3. Attack Scenarios
- 4. Evaluation
- 5. Defense & Responsible Disclosure





Voice becomes an increasingly important interface




Source: Strategy Analytics as cited in press release, Aug, 26, 2016





How do voice assistants work?







What can voice assistants do?







What can a malicious user achieve?








Attack Scenario 1: fake online orders







Attack Scenario 2: spying phone/video calls



8





Attack Scenario 3: exposing user privacy







Related Work

The attacking commands are **audible**, and can be **noticed**!







Related Work

Vaidya et al., **Cocaine Noodles** (WOOT 2015) Carlin et al., **Hidden Voice Commands** (Usenix Security 2016)









DolphinAttack

ATTACKED DEVICE : AMAZON ECHO





Attack Scenario

- > Order stuff
- Make a call
- Read to-do list
- > Open the door

amazon echo

echo dot

Add Alexa to any room

amazon

news 🔗 🕅

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dish

31

hue

Always ready, connected, and fast. Just ask.




Scenario 1. Shopping





Hearing Range of Human and Microphone

Speech recognition systems only accept signals of audible sound.








How can voice assistants accept ultrasound?


• The low-pass filter will remove ultrasonic frequencies to avoid aliasing.







Exploiting the Nonlinearity of Microphone



Let input be $s_{in}(t) = m(t)\cos(2\pi f_c t) + \cos(2\pi f_c t)$


Where m(t) is a baseband voice signal, $m(t) = \cos(2\pi f_m t)$

The baseband voice signals can be demodulated by microphones.






Signal Flow of DolphinAttack








Nonlinearity Effect Validation







Speaker Dependent vs Speaker Independent




Both activation and control commands are required for DolphinAttack.






Speaker Dependent SR – Activation







Design of DolphinAttack








1. Concatenative Synthesis – with owner's voice

- 44 phonemes in English.
- "Hey Siri" includes 6 of them (i.e., HH, EY, S, IH, R, IY).
- Synthesize a desired activation command by searching for relevant phonemes from other words in available recordings.







2. TTS-based Approach – without owner's voice

TTS: Text to Speech

Observation

• Two users with similar vocal tones can activate the other's Siri.

Method



• 35 out of 89 TTS systems can successfully activate a trained Siri.


TTS Systems	voice type #	# of successful types			
1 13 Systems	voice type #	Call 1290	Hey Siri		
Selvy Speech [51]	4	4	2		
Baidu [8]	1	1	0		
Sestek [45]	7	7	2		
NeoSpeech [39]	8	8	2		
Innoetics [59]	12	12	7		
Vocalware [63]	15	15	8		
CereProc [12]	22	22	9		
Acapela [22]	13	13	1		
Fromtexttospeech [58]	7	7	4		

The list of TTS systems used for attacking the Siri trained by the Google TTS system, and the evaluation results on activation and control commands.





Inaudible Voice Commands Transmitter










DolphinAttack

ATTACKED DEVICE : IPHONE SE





Attack Scenario: Make Spying Phone Call



Activate Siri and make a phone call with a normal voice.

10.0

The Rest of Factor

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
DolphinAttack

ATTACKED DEVICE: APPLE WATCH





Attack Scenario: Remote Attack



"Facetime 1551072xxxx"

Under attack

1Jpm







DolphinAttack

COMPROMISED DEVICES



Manuf.	Model	OS/Ver.	SR System	Т	Attacks		Modulation Parameters		Max Dist. (cm)	
					Recog.	Activ.	f_c (kHz) & [Prime f_c] ‡	Depth	Recog.	Activ.
Apple	iPhone 4s	iOS 9.3.5	Siri	Τ	\checkmark	\checkmark	20-42 [27.9]	≥ 9%	175	110
Apple	iPhone 5s	iOS 10.0.2	Siri	T	\checkmark	\checkmark	24.1 26.2 27 29.3 [24.1]	100%	7.5	10
Apple iPhone SE	iOS 10.3.1	Siri		\checkmark	\checkmark	22-28 33 [22.6]	≥ 47%	30	25	
	IF HOLE SE	103 10.3.1	Chrome	Τ	\checkmark	N/A	22-26 28 [22.6]	≥ 37%	16	N/A
Apple	iPhone SE †	iOS 10.3.2	Siri		\checkmark	\checkmark	21-29 31 33 [22.4]	≥ 43%	21	24
Apple	iPhone 6s *	iOS 10.2.1	Siri	Τ		\checkmark	26 [26]	100%	4	12
Apple	iPhone 6 Plus *	iOS 10.3.1	Siri	Τ	×	\checkmark	- [24]	_	_	2
Apple	iPhone 7 Plus *	iOS 10.3.1	Siri		Ń	\checkmark	21 24-29 [25.3]	≥ 50%	18	12
Apple	watch	watchOS 3.1	Siri	T	\checkmark	\checkmark	20-37 [22.3]	≥ 5%	111	164
Apple	iPad mini 4	iOS 10.2.1	Siri	Τ	\checkmark	\checkmark	22-40 [28.8]	≥ 25%	91.6	50.5
Apple	MacBook	macOS Sierra	Siri	T	\checkmark	N/A	20-22 24-25 27-37 39 [22.8]	≥ 76%	31	N/A
LG	Nexus 5X	Android 7.1.1	Google Now	T	\checkmark	\checkmark	30.7 [30.7]	100%	6	11
Asus	Nexus 7	Android 6.0.1	Google Now	T	\checkmark	\checkmark	24-39 [24.1]	≥ 5%	88	87
Samsung	Galaxy S6 edge	Android 6.0.1	S Voice	T	\checkmark	\checkmark	20-38 [28.4]	≥ 17%	36.1	56.2
Huawei	Honor 7	Android 6.0	HiVoice	Ť	\checkmark	\checkmark	29-37 [29.5]	≥ 17%	13	14
Lenovo	ThinkPad T440p	Windows 10	Cortana	T	\checkmark	\checkmark	23.4-29 [23.6]	≥ 35%	58	8
Amazon	Echo *	5589	Alexa		\checkmark	\checkmark	20-21 23-31 33-34 [24]	≥ 20%	165	165
Audi	Q3	N/A	N/A	\bot	\checkmark	N/A	21-23 [22]	100%	10	N/A

[‡] Prime f_c is the carrier wave frequency that exhibits highest baseband amplitude after demodulation.

[†] Another iPhone SE with identical technical spec.

* Experimented with the front/top microphones on devices.





Evaluation

- Impact of languages
- Impact of attack distance
- Impact of background noise
- Impact of sound pressure level






Evaluation: Impact of Languages

DolphinAttack is effective for various languages and voice

- English
- Chinese
- French
- German
- Spanish



The recognition rates of voice commands in five languages


commands.





Evaluation: Impact of Attack Distance

The attack distance has fundamental impact on the effectiveness of DolphinAttack and is device dependent.



The impact of attack distances on the recognition rates for S6 Edge and Apple watch.





Defense










Hardware-Based Defense








Software-Based Defense

- Modulated voice commands are distinctive from genuine ones.
- Supported vector machine (SVM) as the classifier to detect the malicious command from the normal command.
- Result: 100% true positive rate (7/7) and 100% true negative rate (7/7).







Responsible Disclosure

We have contacted the product ٠ security team at Apple, Amazon, Google, Android, Huawei, and Samsung, and received their feedback.



Hello Chen,

Thank you for sharing an advance copy of your paper. We are reviewi ng it and will provide you with our f eedback.

Best regards. Deven Apple Product Security




amazon

Thank you for your report. We are investigating your finding and have assigned you case ID RM029916357. Please be sure to reference that number if you have any follow up questions or want to provide additional information related to your finding. Amazon takes security very seriously and we always appreciate it when researchers work with us to improve our product security.

Kind Regards. Rvan

Chen.

sh...@google.com added comment #10:



Thanks again for this report. After investigation by the Android Security team and the feature team we believe that this is something best addressed through hardware changes on the microphone in future devices.

Thanks, Android Security Team

Hey,



thanks for reaching out. This sounds (or, rather, doesn't?) like a cool attack!

I recommend to report this as an Android bug instead. I'm honestly not sure if hardware issues are covered by this team, but they should at least know the correct point of contact. If they're not responsible either, feel free to circle back to us.

Daniel **Google Security Team**



Dear Chen Yan,

We highly appreciate your concern about the security problems of Huawei products.

we have analyzed the information sent by you regarding potential security issues in Huawei products. In order to verify and address the mentioned problem, could you please provide in addition the following information to help us with verification:

1) the snapshot of software version in vour Honor7, you can find it in the following menus: Settings --> About phone.

2)Detailed steps about DolphinAttack.

3)As you mentioned in your email, it is a universal issue. Did you tested other products, and have you reported it to other vendors, like: Google,

4) The paper you reported to ACM CCS 2017.

5) If CERT assign you a track id. could you plerase share it to us?

Thank you and best regards, Huawei PSIRT



Dear Chen Yan.

We would like to thank you for sharing a potential security issue for Samsung mobile device.

We are looking into the issue you shared, and we want to get any sample sound or Proof of Concept to verify and analyze.

We also want to ask you to share your slides for the ACM CCS conference prior to submittal. so that we can enhance and secure our product.

Thank you.

Stitch It!

NOTE: Please note that we may ask you to report it a different channel if our analysis concludes that there is no security impact.

Very Respectfully, Samsung Mobile Security Technologies Stitch It!

40





Summary

- Voice assistant has become an increasingly popular human-computer interaction mechanism, but they are vulnerable to attacks.
- DolphinAttack is a totally inaudible attack from a new perspective, could attack Siri, Alexa, Google Now, Cortana, Samsung S Voice, Huawei Hi Voice.
- To avoid the abuse of DolphinAttack in reality, we propose two defense solutions from the aspects of both hardware and software.





Questions

DolphinAttack Homepage: http://dolphinattack.com/

USS Lab Homepage: <u>http://usslab.org/</u>